MARINA, Brazil — The collapse of the Fundão tailings dam in Mariana, Minas Gerais, on November 5, 2015, remains one of Brazil’s defining environmental disasters. It killed 19 people and caused extensive human, environmental and socioeconomic damage along the Rio Doce.

More than nine years later, federal and state authorities, justice institutions and the mining companies Samarco, Vale and BHP signed a new judicial reparations agreement valued at R$170 billion. The deal was signed on October 25, 2024, and homologated by Brazil’s Supreme Federal Court, known as the STF, on November 6, 2024, in Petition 13,157/DF.

The agreement did not establish a criminal conviction and does not resolve every separate claim connected with the disaster. Its significance lies instead in creating a new framework for reparations, with defined corporate payment and performance obligations and a substantially expanded role for public authorities in carrying out and governing recovery programs.

What happened

Fundão collapsed in Mariana on November 5, 2015. The failure caused deaths and widespread damage extending along the Rio Doce.

The 2024 agreement was signed by the federal government, the governments of Minas Gerais and Espírito Santo, prosecution and public-defender institutions, and Samarco, Vale and BHP. Its R$170 billion value combines new payment and performance obligations with amounts reported as having been previously spent.

A central change was institutional. The agreement ended the Fundação Renova-centered model that had been used in the response to the disaster. Under the replacement structure, public authorities took on substantial responsibilities for execution and governance, while the companies retained obligations set out in the accord.

Why it matters

The new arrangement seeks to put the delivery, allocation and oversight of reparations under a more direct public-sector framework. That makes implementation a central test of whether the agreement produces effective results for affected areas and communities.

Official records from 2026 show that implementation remains active, including decisions on resource allocation, expenditure tracking, monitoring arrangements and social-participation structures. These are not merely administrative details: they determine how obligations in a court-approved agreement are translated into programs and spending.

The agreement’s approval by the STF gives it judicial force, but approval is distinct from a finding of criminal liability. Nor does it by itself settle all claims that may be associated with the 2015 disaster.

The bigger picture

The Mariana disaster continues to matter because the effects of environmental damage and the process of repair can extend far beyond the day of a dam collapse. The Rio Doce agreement is now also a test of governance: whether public institutions, companies and participation mechanisms can deliver and oversee a large, long-running recovery program.

The territorial reach requires careful distinction. Some agreement programs encompass 200 municipalities in Minas Gerais within the Rio Doce basin. Official implementation materials, however, identify 38 municipalities in Minas Gerais as directly affected. Coverage by a program should not be read as meaning all 200 municipalities experienced the same direct physical impact from the collapse.

New participation mechanisms are part of the revised architecture, alongside public bodies responsible for governance and oversight. Their continued operation is relevant to communities seeking visibility into how priorities are set and resources are used.

By the numbers

What happens next

The next phase is implementation. Official 2026 materials document continuing work on allocation, execution, monitoring and participation, indicating that the agreement’s practical effects remain a live matter of public oversight.

Future assessments will depend on the performance of specific programs, allocations and measurable implementation benchmarks, rather than on the agreement’s headline value alone. The 2024 accord created a new legal and institutional route for reparations; the continuing question is how that route is administered in the areas covered by the Rio Doce recovery effort.